The Copyright Crusher: How Apple’s iTunes Is a Vehicle Designed for Copyright Infringement and Apple’s Legal Liability from Its Creation by Beckman, Sydney A.
Texas A&M Law Review 
Volume 1 Issue 4 
2014 
The Copyright Crusher: How Apple’s iTunes Is a Vehicle Designed 
for Copyright Infringement and Apple’s Legal Liability from Its 
Creation 
Sydney A. Beckman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sydney A. Beckman, The Copyright Crusher: How Apple’s iTunes Is a Vehicle Designed for Copyright 
Infringement and Apple’s Legal Liability from Its Creation, 1 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 901 (2014). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V1.I4.4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Texas A&M Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, 
please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
THE COPYRIGHT CRUSHER: HOW APPLE’S
ITUNES IS A VEHICLE DESIGNED FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND
APPLE’S LEGAL LIABILITY FROM
ITS CREATION
By: Sydney A. Beckman*
ABSTRACT
Authors of original works (such as music, books, et cetera) have certain
exclusive rights including, but not limited to, the reproduction of copyrighted
works in copies and the preparation of derivative works. Apple’s iTunes is a
vehicle for infringement. The conversion of compact discs (“CDs”) to a com-
pressed format for portable music players such as iPods, iPhones, iPads, and
computers violates a copyright holder’s exclusive rights. This Article discusses
the fundamental issue of copyright protections, the way iTunes facilitates the
infringement of these rights, and the legal liability of Apple for creation of this
software.
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I. PREFACE
A summary of this Article was presented at the inaugural Intellec-
tual Property Symposium hosted by the Texas A&M Law Review and
was held at the Texas A&M University School of Law in Fort Worth,
Texas, on October 25, 2013.
The first part of this Article discusses basic copyright law focusing
on the rights of copyright holders as specifically applied to music. This
is followed by a discussion of the applicable technology and how it
works with regard to specific infringing actions. The next two sections
address the law again, this time focusing on how the creation of iTunes
and its operation infringe on rights protected by the Copyright Act
while ruling out potential defenses. Next, the Article addresses Ap-
ple’s potential liability from the creation of iTunes. Finally, a brief dis-
cussion of damages is presented.
II. INTRODUCTION
“The key idea behind all of these [bundles] of rights is giving the
copyright owners the ability to meaningfully exploit their works.”1
“It seems almost every player—publishers, search engines, libraries,
pirates2 and even some scholars—is vying for position at authors’ ex-
pense.”3 At the heart of an author’s protection is the law of copyright.
The advances in technology have made the violation of copyright laws
easier and hence, more and more prevalent. “From its beginning, the
law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying
equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need for
copyright protection.”4 As noted author Scott Turow once wrote:
1. Shira Perlmutter, former Associate Registrar for Policy and International Af-
fairs, United States Copyright Office, Franklin Pierce Law Center’s Seventh Biennial
Intellectual Property System Major Problems Conference, Digital Technology and
Copyright: A Threat or a Promise?, IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology 291,
309 (1999).
2. Mr. Turow is, of course, referring to “virtual pirates” as opposed to the eye-
patch wearing, sword-wielding, sea-born, peg-leg type.
3. Scott Turow, Op-Ed., The Slow Death of the American Author, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2013, at A21.
4. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
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Authors[5] practice one of the few professions directly protected in
the Constitution, which instructs[6] Congress “to promote the pro-
gress of Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.” The idea is that a diverse literary culture,
created by authors whose livelihoods, and thus independence, can’t
be threatened, is essential to democracy.7
The laws of copyright are, in essence, a legislative attempt to strike
a balance. The balance is intended to weigh the rights of a copyright
holder against the uses that may be sought by those who enjoy the
copyrighted work. These uses swing wildly from the commercial ex-
ploitation of works created by another to the private uses of someone
or something (an entity) that may have no commercial purpose at all.
Regardless of the intended uses, it is the balance—or attempt to
achieve a balance—that often rocks the copyright world. Although in-
itially detailed in the United States Code, it is the interpretation and
legislative intent that is often examined through the court systems,
both foreign and domestic. As more “wealth” is accumulated through
intellectual property, this examination or testing of the system be-
comes more prevalent each day.
Rarely, it seems, are companies or individuals prepared to expend
the tremendous amount of resources necessary to prosecute copyright
infringement litigation based on “principle.” Rather—it is the bottom
line—dollars and cents—that causes battles royal through our court
systems.8
Changes in technology create new questions, new issues, and new
challenges with regard to copyright legislation. Unfortunately, copy-
right laws are slow to catch up to changes in technology.9 As a result,
courts are required to fit new technology into the existing legal para-
digm. Often this results in a court attempting to force the proverbial
square peg into a round hole. Definitions, applications of those defini-
tions, and technology contemplated by existing legislation are often
stretched beyond their original designs because many technological
5. This includes authors of music, artists, et cetera.
6. Although Mr. Turow was correct—in spirit—he was wrong factually. Article 1,
Clause 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with the “power” to protect, not the
“requirement” to protect.
7. Turow, supra note 3.
8. In a now somewhat famous dispute involving an intellectual property dispute,
albeit a Patent dispute, it has been estimated that Apple, Inc. spent over $60 million
dollars in legal fees for one case. Stephanie Mosca, Apple, Samsung patent cases offer
big payout for IP lawyers, INSIDE COUNSEL, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/12/11/
apple-samsung-patent-cases-offer-big-payout-for-ip (last visited on Jan. 14, 2014).
9. In the last 20 years (since Jan. 1, 1994), various parts of the Copyright Act of
1976 have been amended by legislation thirty-three times. Specifically, section 101 has
been amended twelve times, section 102 amended zero times, and section 106
amended three times.
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inventions were not, and could not have been, contemplated by legis-
lative drafters.
The Copyright Act was enacted in virtually its current form in
1976.10 Some thirty-five years later, in October of 2001, the iPod was
brought to market.11 We did not have the iPhone until 2007.12 The
iPad was not introduced until 2010.13 With the introduction of these
new technologies, new uses are frequently discovered. These new uses
could hardly have been contemplated and, therefore, addressed by
legislation. Although technology advances at seemingly breakneck
speeds, legislation is slow to catch up.
Many remember the old cartoon strip Dick Tracy.14 The strip made
its debut in 1931 and ran until 1977.15 In that cartoon, Dick Tracy
would frequently use a watch to make phone calls. No one could con-
template between 1931 and 1977 that such ability would be a reality.
The smartphones and smart devices of today offer far more than one
could have contemplated in the 1970s much less the 1930s.
III. THE LAW (PART 1)
United States copyright law is embodied in Title 17 of the United
States Code. For purposes of this Article, the relevant sections are
101, 102, and 106 of the Code. Section 101 provides a number of defi-
nitions relevant to copyright law and this discussion.16 One such defi-
nition is that of sound recordings:
10. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
11. Apple Press Info, iPod + iTunes Timeline, http://www.apple.com/pr/products/
ipodhistory/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
12. Apple Press Info, iPhone Premieres This Friday Night at Apple Retail Stores
(June 28, 2007), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/06/28iPhone-Premieres-This-
Friday-Night-at-Apple-Retail-Stores.html.
13. Apple Press Info, iPad Arrives This Saturday (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.ap-
ple.com/pr/library/2010/03/29iPad-Arrives-This-Saturday.html.
14. Dick Tracy is the title of a comic strip that was authored by Chester Gould.
15. Albin Krebbs, Chester Gould, Cartoonist, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/12/us/chester-gould-cartoonist-dies-at-at-84.
html.
16. The applicable section, 17 U.S.C. § 101, states:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, as used in this title, the following
terms and their variant forms mean the following:
. . .
“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work
is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes the
material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
“Copyright owner”, with respect to any one of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.
. . .
A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first
time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that
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“Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a se-
ries of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless
has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time,
and where the work has been prepared in different versions, each version
constitutes a separate work.
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations,
or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of au-
thorship, is a “derivative work”.
A “device”, “machine”, or “process” is one now known or later
developed.
A “digital transmission” is a transmission in whole or in part in a digital or
other non-analog format.
. . .
The term “financial gain” includes receipt, or expectation of receipt, of
anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.
. . .
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A
work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is
“fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simul-
taneously with its transmission.
. . .
The terms “including” and “such as” are illustrative and not limitative.
. . .
“Phonorecords” are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. The term “phonorecords” includes the mate-
rial object in which the sounds are first fixed.
. . .
“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons
for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display,
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not
of itself constitute publication.
. . .
“Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompany-
ing a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which
they are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other
phonorecords, in which they are embodied.17
Sound recordings are specifically protected under Section 102. This
Section sets forth those items of intellectual property that are subject
to copyright protection.18
Given that sound recordings clearly encompass the “music” that is
embodied on audio CDs and given that this music is subject to copy-
right protection, the next question is, “What does this protection
mean?”
Turning to Section 106, this statute enumerates those rights that are
specifically protected—that is, what exclusive rights are held by own-
ers of copyrighted works. Section 106 provides, in relevant part, the
following exclusive rights:
Subject to sections 107[19] through 122, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of
the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending . . . .20
IV. THE RIGHT RIGHTS
As reflected in Section IV infra, with the creation of music the au-
thor has the right to reproduce and prepare derivative works. With
current technology this translates to a number of applications, each of
which potentially requires a license from the copyright holder. The
following non-exclusive list reflects a number of potential
applications:
17. Id.
18. The applicable section, 17 U.S.C. § 102, states:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102.
19. This Article will briefly examine Section 107 as a potential defense and will
discuss why it is inapplicable to the infringement discussed in this Article.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106.








New arrangements of copyright-protected songs;
On-demand streams;
Podcasts;
Print or display lyrics or sheet music (print rights);
Public Performance(s);
Recordings with samples;
Ringtones, ringtunes, or ringbacks;
Sound recording or master use rights;
Tethered or limited downloads; and
Others.
As new applications develop, the language of the copyright law, as
written, is intended to envelop such applications in its existing body of
rights. An artist can choose to retain, transfer, release, or license the
rights. Often authors will transfer some, but not all rights. On occasion
all rights will be transferred.21 Regardless, when someone other than
the copyright holder seeks to utilize someone else’s protected work in
a way that is protected by the copyright law, that person (or entity)
must obtain permission or be in violation of the copyright law.22
V. THE TECHNOLOGY
To examine the technology involved, we must first answer the ques-
tion: What is an audio compact disc (CD)? An overly simplistic expla-
nation is that an audio compact disc is a combination of a thin layer of
metal embedded in a plastic casing. The metal portion of the object
contains physical pits that (effectively) represent ones (1’s) and zeros
(0’s).23 The format used is typically referred to as CDA (Compact
Disc Audio). This format is “read” by all audio CD players. The CDA
21. Usually authors transfer all rights only with an outright sale of the piece of
intellectual property.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
23. As illustrated on the Georgia State University Website hosted by the Depart-
ment of Physics and Astronomy:
Analog sound data is digitized by sampling at 44.1 kHz and coding as binary
numbers in the pits on the compact disc. As the focused laser beam sweeps
over the pits, it reproduces the binary numbers in the detection circuitry.
The same function as the ‘pits’ can be accomplished by magnetooptical re-
cording. The digital signal is then reconverted to analog form by a D/A con-
verter. Compact Disc Audio, HYPERPHYSICS, http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.
gsu.edu/hbase/audio/cdplay.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
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format is an industry standard (referred to as the Red Book audio
standard).24 This standard is used for encoding music on CDs. These
CDA files can be played only from a CD player or drive. This format
cannot be stored on a hard drive or even in the “cloud.”25 To store
these files on a hard drive, in the cloud, in digital memory, or else-
where (anything other than another audio Compact Disc) the files
must be converted to a format that the device can read. There are
numerous digital formats to which a music file can be converted.26
Typical formats are WAV, MP3, or AAC.27
Historically, most people would listen to music by “playing” an au-
dio CD in a CD player or on a computer that had a disc drive capable
of playing an audio CD. However, as technology advanced, so did the
options for people wanting to listen to music. The reader may recall
vinyl albums, 8-track players, and cassette players. These days, 8-track
players are obsolete, vinyl albums are incredibly rare (although mak-
ing somewhat of a comeback for nostalgic purposes), and cassettes
and cassette players are all but extinct.
The invention of digital music players significantly changed the
world. Although Apple28 did not invent the music player, its inven-
tions (and marketing) have changed the music industry and the way
people listen to music.
VI. THE UNDERLYING INFRINGEMENT
There are many types of copyright infringement. One form is direct
infringement. Direct infringement means the “[violation of] at least
one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106.”29
To fully grasp the infringement that occurs with the use of iTunes,
one must first examine what iTunes does not do. It does not accom-
plish what has been called “space-shifting.” The concept of space-
shifting is that of moving an object, thing, data file, or in this case, a
piece of music, from one place to another. A simple analogy is that if
you have a widget and you move that widget from one box to another
24. Red Book (Audio CD Standard), http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/
wiki100k/docs/Red_Book_(audio_CD_standard).html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
25. The cloud is merely digital storage connected via the Internet or via an
intranet.
26. A non-exclusive list of formats includes: MP3, AAC, WAV, FLAC, OGG,
ALAC, AIFF, Protected AAC< Audible 2, 3 & 4, MP3 VBR, AAX, Apple Lossless
AIFF, and AAX+.
27. Although there are no perfect analogies, one way to look at the conversion
process is to think of it as language translation. English and Spanish are both lan-
guages and the words may have the same meanings but Spanish is not English and
one might have to translate it before a person could “read” it.
28. All references to “Apple” refer to Apple, Inc. Apple and the Apple logo are
registered trademarks of Apple, Inc.
29. A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).
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box, you have shifted the widget from one space to another space. The
important distinction between space-shifting and what happens when
music is transformed into a different format is that in the former ex-
ample the widget has not changed form. The argument that changing
music from its form on an audio CD (CDA format) to a different for-
mat (such as MP3) is merely space-shifting has been rejected by the
courts.30
In contrast to the concept of space-shifting, the act of changing the
form of the music file from one format (such as CDA) to another
format (such as MP3) is shape-shifting.31 Unlike space-shifting, shape-
shifting alters the form of the file.
As mentioned previously, one common format that is utilized is
MP3.32 Converting a file into another format, such as MP3, serves two
primary purposes. First, the file can be stored on a hard drive, a flash-
drive, or in the cloud; second, the file can be played by a portable
music player. These purposes have helped to drive the new music
industry.
By converting a song or songs from CDA to a digital format, the
rights of the copyright holder are being directly infringed. The crea-
tion of the song in this new format is a new work, a derivative, that is a
right specifically reserved to the copyright holder. Of course, Apple is
not doing the direct infringement, but rather created the mechanism
that facilitates infringement by the user. We must next examine how
this mechanism works.
VII. HOW ITUNES WORKS
Sometime after the invention of various formats and the creation of
“digital” music, along came Apple and Apple’s iTunes Software. Ap-
ple describes iTunes, in part, as a solution that
keeps all your music, movies, and TV shows all in one place. Instead
of going through stacks and stacks of CDs, you can import them into
30. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
31. For a detail discussion of shape-shifting, see Sydney A. Beckman, From CD to
MP3: Compression in the New Age of Technology Overlooked Infringement or Fair
Use?, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 469, 484–92 (2007).
32. According to PC MAG, www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/47286/mp3 (last
visited Dec. 30, 2013), the definition of an MP3 is as follows:
(MPEG-1 Audio Layer III) The audio compression technology that revolu-
tionized digital music . . . . Derived from the audio sections of the MPEG-1
and MPEG-2 video specifications, MP3 compresses CD-quality sound by a
factor of roughly 10, while retaining most of the original fidelity. For exam-
ple, a 40MB CD track is turned into approximately a 4MB MP3 file . . . .
MP3 files are played on the computer via media player software, such as
Apple’s iTunes and Microsoft’s Windows Media Player, as well as in count-
less iPods and other handheld players . . . . MP3 sound quality cannot fully
match the original CD . . . but millions of people consider it “good enough”
because they can pack thousands of songs into a tiny pocket-sized player.
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iTunes and quickly browse your whole collection. Organize it any
way you want. Move it onto any of your devices. Play it whenever—
and wherever—the mood strikes. Even have Genius make mixes of
songs that go great together.33
The critical feature, for purposes of this Article, is the fact that iTunes
has a feature—in fact a significant feature—that imports a user’s
Compact Discs (“CDs”) into the iTunes library. In doing so, the
iTunes software changes—transforms—the data file from its original
form to a new and compressed form.
A. The Form of Music
As previously discussed, audio CDs contain music in the form of
“CDA.” CDA files can be played only from a CD player and the files
must be converted to WAV or MP3 files for storage on a computer
hard disc or DVD disc.
Apple’s iTunes imports audio tracks from audio CDs and converts
them into one of a different number of formats: AAC, AIFF, Apple
Lossless Encoder, MP3, and WAV. Figure 1 illustrates the process:
FIGURE 1
It is significant that iTunes is incapable of copying tracks from an
audio CD and retaining their original CDA format. Figure 2 shows a
screen capture of iTunes’s options for CD ripping:
FIGURE 2
33. Features, ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is/ (last visited July 14,
2013).
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As Figure 2 illustrates, iTunes does not have the capability of creat-
ing a true “copy” of an audio CD. Rather, when iTunes imports a
music track it changes the format, (shape-shifting), to rip the music to
a hard drive, portable audio player, or the cloud. Unlike the previous
analogy of moving a widget from one box to another, with iTunes, if
the widget in the first box were four inches square, when it is moved
into the second box, after iTunes’s conversion, it would now be two
inches square. It is still a widget, it is still square, but now it is much
smaller. The music is still music; to the human ear it sounds the same,
but the file is much smaller.
It is this change, this derivation of the original work, that is the in-
fringing activity. As an analogy, consider the idea of a language trans-
lation.34 J.K. Rowling’s novel Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone
has been translated into multiple languages. Suppose you have a copy
in English but would like a copy in Spanish. Could Apple, Inc., create
a program that lets you take a copy of the novel and translate it into
Spanish? In doing so, this deprives Ms. Rowling of her right to create
and sell a derivative work, that is, the Spanish edition of the novel. If
Apple creates the software, it deprives her of that right and the profits
that come from the sale of that new work. Suppose that software
could change the novel into virtually any language. How much money
would be lost to the author? Currently, if you want a Spanish edition
and an English edition you have to purchase both editions. Without a
software product like Apple’s iTunes, if you have an audio CD of
Michael Jackson’s Thriller and you wanted to have a digital copy, you
would have to purchase a digital copy. Apple’s iTunes completely
eliminates that need. Now, you can shape-shift your audio CD and use
iTunes to create a digital copy without any expense.
VIII. THE LAW (PART 2): THE AUDIO HOME RECORDING ACT
When considering the possibility of infringing activities, it is neces-
sary to review possible defenses. One such defense lies within the Au-
dio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”).35 The AHRA (which is
embodied within the Copyright Act) had a number of purposes. One
such purpose was to eliminate liability of consumers when making
copies of recordings for personal use. The statute provides, in relevant
part:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of
copyright . . . based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of [a
digital audio recording device] or medium or making digital musical
recordings or analog musical recordings.36
34. See supra text accompanying note 27.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
36. Id. § 1008.
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Given the statute, one must ask two questions. First, Does the stat-
ute intend to protect a third party (including a corporation such as
Apple) from an infringement action when the infringement is incurred
by a “consumer” as referenced in the statute? Although it is highly
doubtful that the legislature intended to protect potential defendants
other than consumers, the answer is preempted by a different
question.
The second question is, “What is a digital audio recording device?”
Or, more precisely, Does iTunes constitute a digital audio recording
device? The reason that answer is significant is because under section
1008, the prohibition of an action for infringement, applies only to
actions “brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright . . .
based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of [a digital audio
recording device].”37 Therefore, if iTunes is not considered a “digital
audio recording device” then the defense is not applicable. Also, if
music on a hard drive is not considered a digital music recording, then
the AHRA would not apply.
Both of these issues were addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Record-
ing Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
Inc.38 In the Diamond case, the court was faced with determining
whether or not a Rio portable music player was a digital audio record-
ing device capable of reproducing digital music recordings.39
A. Defining Digital Music Recording
As part of the analysis, the court considered the fact that the Rio
player had music installed on it from a computer. As such, the court
was faced with an examination of the role a computer and its storage
devices played in the transfer and how such a role was impacted by
the AHRA.40 The court recognized that “almost all hard drives con-
tain numerous programs (e.g., for word processing, scheduling ap-
pointments) and databases that are not incidental to any sound files
that may be stored on the hard drive.”41 The court, referring to the
definition in the act, noted that the AHRA provides that:
(B) A “digital musical recording” does not include a material ob-
ject—
(i) in which the fixed sounds consist entirely of spoken word
recordings, or
(ii) in which one or more computer programs are fixed, except
that a digital musical recording may contain statements or
instructions constituting the fixed sounds and incidental
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
39. Id. at 1076.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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material, and statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in order to bring about the perception, repro-
duction, or communication of the fixed sounds and inciden-
tal material.42
The court held that a hard drive is excluded from the definition of
digital music recordings.43 If a hard drive does not fall within the defi-
nition, then the Rio player could “not record ‘directly’ from ‘digital
music recordings’ and therefore could not be a digital audio recording
device.”44 Explaining further, the court examined the legislative his-
tory and found that
[t]he Senate Report further states that the definition ‘is intended to
cover those objects commonly understood to embody sound record-
ings and their underlying works. . . . [T]his definition only extends to
the material objects in which songs are normally fixed: ‘[t]hat is re-
corded compact discs, digital audio tapes, audio cassettes, long-play-
ing albums, digital compact cassettes, and mini-discs. There are
simply no grounds in either the plain language of the definition or in
the legislative history for interpreting the term ‘digital musical re-
cording’ to include songs fixed on computer hard drives.45
B. Defining a Digital Audio Recording Device
The court also looked at computers and the definition of a digital
audio recording device. The court held that “[u]nder the plain mean-
ing of the Act’s definition of digital audio recording devices, com-
puters (and their hard drives) are not digital audio recording devices
because their ‘primary purpose’ is not to make digital audio copied
recordings.”46 The court recognized that a computer’s primary pur-
pose is to “run various programs and to record data necessary to run
those programs and perform various tasks.”47 The court also consulted
with the legislative history, noting the consistency with its finding:
“The legislative history is consistent with [the court’s] interpretation
42. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B) (emphasis added)).
43. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1076.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1077.
46. Id. at 1078. The court relied on section 1001(3), which provides, in part,
A “digital audio recording device” is any machine or device of a type com-
monly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not in-
cluded with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording
function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and
that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use,
except for—
(A) professional model products, and
(B) dictation machines, answering machines, and other audio recording
equipment that is designed and marketed primarily for the creation of sound
recordings resulting from the fixation of nonmusical sounds.
17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).
47. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078.
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of the Act’s provisions, stating that ‘the typical personal computer
would not fall within the definition of “digital audio recording de-
vice”’ because a personal computer’s ‘recording function is designed
and marketed primarily for the recording of data and computer
programs.’”
C. The Act Does Not Apply
As noted by the court, exclusion of “hard drives from the definition
of digital music recording, and the exemption of computers generally
from the Act’s ambit . . . ‘effectively eviscerates the [Act]’ because
‘[a]ny recording device could evade [ ] regulation simply by passing
the music through a computer and ensuring that the [digital] file re-
sided momentarily on the hard drive.’”48 The court found that such a
loophole was “expressly designed” into the AHRA.49
Although the court in Diamond was concerned with liability under
the act for Rio’s alleged failure to comply with certain safeguards, the
effect is the inapplicability of the act’s defenses with regard to iTunes
and, as a result, Apple and its potential liability. By excluding hard
drives and computers from the AHRA, the prohibition against an en-
forcement action does not apply as well.50 Therefore, Apple, Inc., has
no defense from liability for infringement from the Audio Home Re-
cording Act.
IX. THE LAW (PART 3): FAIR USE OR NOT
An oft-used legal defense to copyright infringement (whether viable
or not) is that of fair use. The Copyright Act specifically provides that
“fair use” is a limitation on exclusive rights held by copyright hold-
ers.51 The act permits, as a defense to infringement, the copying of a
protected work for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research.”52 As discussed, the newly created work resulting
from the shape-shifting created by iTunes would not fall into any of
the aforementioned categories. In assessing fair use, the Copyright
Act lists a number of factors for consideration:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
52. Id.
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.53
Although the application of the fair-use defense is often challenged
and, at times, difficult to define, in the situation created by iTunes, fair
use clearly does not apply. In looking at the purpose of the use, the
user is avoiding the purchase of the “translation.” That is, he or she
need not purchase a digital copy as he or she can use iTunes to create
his or her own, thereby avoiding the cost associated with purchasing
the music in a digital format.
The nature of the work, that is a complete song or complete album,
is copied in its entirety. In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
the Sixth Circuit examined the issue of copying a small portion of a
song (3 notes lasting 4 seconds),54 which is called a “sample,” and us-
ing that sample in a different work.55 The Sixth Circuit found that
such “sampling” was infringement.56
Typically, fair-use defenses are used when a small portion of a copy-
righted work is used. For example, a small portion of a book used in a
classroom setting might be acceptable whereas a complete copy of a
textbook given freely to each student would not. In the case of iTunes,
the entire work is copied.
Section 107(4) provides the most critical factor to infringement fa-
cilitated by iTunes. Recall the analogy of a book translation. Each
song, each album, is one less sale. The use of iTunes is not fair use; it is
simply the deprivation of a commercial opportunity for the copyright
holder.
X. APPLE’S INFRINGEMENT
A. Types of Infringement
There are three (possibly four) types of copyright infringement that
could result in liability for a defendant: direct, vicarious, inducement,
and contributory.57 The infringement applicable to this discussion, and
specifically Apple, is that of contributory infringement. As will be dis-
cussed more fully below, Apple contributes to the direct infringement
of the user.
53. Id.
54. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
55. Id. at 801.
56. It should be noted that the 6th Circuit did not address the issue of fair use. The
trial court found that sampling was not infringement so the issue of fair use was not
litigated. The case is used merely to illustrate that when copying a small portion of
music is considered infringement, it is highly unlikely that a song or album in its en-
tirely could be considered fair use.
57. There is some question among scholars as to the viability of inducement in-
fringement. A discussion of this particular infringement exceeds the scope of this Ar-
ticle. Rather, this Article addresses the applicable type of infringement that would be
relevant to Apple, which is contributory infringement.
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For contributory infringement to apply, one must prove two ele-
ments: knowledge of the infringement; and material contribution to
the direct infringer’s activities.58
B. The Sony Case
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,59 the Su-
preme Court examined the issue of contributory infringement with re-
gard to Sony’s videotape recorders (VTRs). Although the allegations
and facts are far removed from the issue presented here, the holding is
relevant to this discussion. The Sony case involved what the Court
found to be time-shifting.60 That is, recording a program that was
broadcast to be viewed at a later time. The Court held that Sony
would not be liable for contributory infringement as long as the prod-
uct is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. In the Sony case, the
device examined by the Court was the Betamax VTR. The device had
very limited functionality. It could record a signal (comprising both
audio and video), store it on a videotape, and play it back at a later
time. Consumers could, of course, use this technology for both infring-
ing and non-infringing uses. In analyzing the uses of the technology,
the Court ultimately held that Sony was not liable for contributory
infringement. In so holding, the Court found that the “contributory
infringement doctrine . . . may require the courts to look . . . to the
products or activities that make . . . duplication possible. The staple
article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copy-
right holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, the
sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”61
C. Betamax Versus iTunes
In the Sony case, Sony’s VTR had two functions (to record and play
back recordings) but many uses. The function of recording and play-
back could be used for many non-infringing uses. As such, the Court
held that Sony could not be liable for contributory infringement.62 In
short, the Court found that time-shifting was a non-infringing use and,
therefore, the VTR was capable of substantial non-infringing uses.
58. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
59. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
60. Id. at 456.
61. Id. at 442.
62. Id. at 456.
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On the contrary, as noted above, iTunes has many functions. One of
those functions is to rip music from an audio compact disc to a hard
drive. This function could be a stand-alone function. However, Apple
has combined the function of ripping with other functions such as a
media player and, most recently, an Internet radio player. These func-
tions are wholly independent but merely contained within a single
software application. Nevertheless, the issue of infringement sur-
rounds the uses tied to the ripping ability of iTunes.
As noted above, the ripping function of iTunes cannot make a copy.
It cannot space-shift (move an audio CD file from one place to an-
other), nor can it time-shift (record a song for later playback). The
only use that the ripping function has in iTunes is to shape-shift. That
is, to change the format of a song from CDA to another format such
as AAC, AIFF, Apple Lossless, MP3, or WAV.63
The only way that use of the iTunes ripping function would not be
an infringement is if the user had the right to create the derivative
work. The Author is unaware of any commercial audio compact disc
that includes any rights to the consumer other than the right to play
the music contained on the audio CD.
D. The Grokster Case
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, the Supreme
Court was faced not with a question of infringement but rather the
question of liability.64 Specifically, the question it addressed was
“under what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of
both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringe-
ment by third parties using the product.”65
A brief discussion of the facts is relevant to this Article as many
facts mirror the use of iTunes and Apple’s role in the infringing
activities.66
The respondents (Grokster and StreamCast) distributed software
that facilitated the sharing of electronic files through peer-to-peer net-
works. These networks were used for, among other purposes, “sharing
copyrighted music and video files without authorization.”67 The suit
resulted from “[a] group of copyright holders . . . [suing the respon-
dents] for their users’ copyright infringements, alleging that they
knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users
to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in violation of the
Copyright Act.”68
63. As of iTunes version 11.1.3 these were the only options available.
64. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
65. Id. at 918.
66. The Analogy Section below compares the facts and findings of the Grokster
case to the real-world application of the use of iTunes and its infringement.
67. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 920.
68. Id.
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Furthermore,
as for quantification, the parties’ anecdotal and statistical evidence
entered . . . does not say much about which files are actually
downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the software is
used to obtain copies of unprotected material. But [plaintiffs’] evi-
dence gives reason to think that the vast majority of users’
downloads are acts of infringement, and because well over 100 mil-
lion copies of the software in question are known to have been
downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the . . . networks
each month, the probable scope of copyright infringement is
staggering.69
The Court found “the record [to be] replete with evidence that from
the moment [the respondents] began to distribute their free software,
each one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to
download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage
infringement.”70
The Court found that evidence “of express promotion, marketing,
and intent to promote further, the business models employed by [re-
spondents] confirm that their principal object was use of their
software to download copyrighted works. [Respondents] receive no
revenue from users, who obtain the software itself for nothing.”71
E. Inducement of Infringement
The Grokster Court found that
[t]he rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early
cases is no different today. Evidence of “active steps . . . taken to
encourage direct infringement,” such as advertising an infringing
use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an af-
firmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing
that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance
to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product
suitable for some lawful use.72
The Court held “that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”73
XI. APPLE IS THE NEW GROKSTER
Many of the actions taken by the respondents in the Grokster case
were taken by Apple. Where Grokster facilitated the copyright in-
69. Id. at 922.
70. Id. at 923.
71. Id. at 926.
72. Id. at 936 (citing Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
73. Id. at 918.
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fringement of music over the Internet, Apple facilitates the copyright
infringement of music through its software, ripping the music from
audio compact discs.
Apple’s actions share the following actions with the respondents in
the Grokster case:
• Apple’s iTunes software is distributed for free.74
• From its inception, Apple has promoted the use of its software
for purposes of infringement advertising that “iTunes lets
Mac[75] users import songs from their favorite CDs; compress
them into the popular MP3 format and store them on their com-
puter’s hard drive.”76
• Even now, Apple lists as one of iTunes’s features the ability to,
“[i]nstead of going through stacks and stacks of CDs, . . . import
them into iTunes and quickly browse your whole collection.”77
• Apple earns no income from the ripping of CDs to a format
readable by a portable music player.
Apple stands in the shoes of the respondents in Grokster. It is sim-
ply using a different device. Instead of software that transmits songs
over the Internet, Apple’s software converts music from CDA to a
digital format. This is clearly contributory infringement as Apple
meets the two elements:
(1) Apple has knowledge of the infringement as it advertises the
capability; and
(2) Apple materially contributes to the infringement with its crea-
tion of the ripping function in iTunes.
XII. DAMAGES
A thorough analysis of a copyright holder’s potential losses (i.e.,
damages) as a result of Apple’s infringement exceeds the scope of this
Article. However, a brief analysis illustrates the massive losses that
copyright holders have incurred.
For every song “ripped” instead of being purchased in a format
readable by a digital audio player, a copyright holder is potentially
deprived of income.
It is estimated that the average performer receives approximately
$.25 for each song sold. As of February 6, 2013, approximately 25 bil-
74. Download, http://www.apple.com/itunes/download/?cid=wwa-us-kwg-music-
itu (last visited on Jan. 7, 2014) (Apple’s iTunes free-download page).
75. When first introduced, iTunes was available only on the Mac and was later
adapted for Window’s based machines.
76. Apple Press Info, Apple Releases iTunes—World’s Best and Easiest to Use
Jukebox Software (Jan. 9, 2001), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2001/01/09Apple-In-
troduces-iTunes-Worlds-Best-and-Easiest-To-Use-Jukebox-Software.html.
77. Apple’s iTunes, Features Page, http://www.apple.com/itunes/features/ (last vis-
ited on Jan. 7, 2014).
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lion have been downloaded. Therefore the estimated royalties on that
number of songs would be $6.25 billion.78
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately count how
many songs have been ripped from CDs, a simple calculation can
show the enormity of the damages. Assume that only 10% of the num-
ber of songs downloaded have been ripped (presumably the real num-
ber is significantly larger). That would be 2.5 billion. At $.25 per song,
the amount of losses for copyright holders would be $625 million.
Over half a billion dollars is not insignificant.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Apple is an innovator and a creator of great products. Unfortu-
nately, in the midst of creating new technologies to, in part, solve
problems of consumers, it has trampled on the rights of copyright
holders who own the rights to sound recordings. The copyright hold-
ers have certain rights, which include, among others, the right to de-
rivative works. ITunes, through its function of ripping songs from
audio CDs to digital forms, creates derivative works (analogous to a
translation). This new creation violates the exclusive right to create
derivative works. There is no exception, nor defense, to this infringe-
ment. As a result, copyright holders have potentially been deprived of
billions of dollars of royalties. Apple as a result of its creation and
distribution of iTunes and the promotion of “ripping” is liable for con-
tributory infringement.
78. To be clear, the amount of damages resulting from infringement would occur
only on songs that were ripped from CDs to a digital format that is readable and
capable of being stored by and on a digital media player. Legally downloaded songs
are not forms of infringement. The numbers are used merely as an illustration of the
massive amount of songs that have been downloaded and the likelihood that an enor-
mous number of songs have been “ripped” from audio CDs via iTunes.
